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Summary
This thesis studies the eects of terms of trade changes on the Norwegian econ-
omy by applying a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with a
sovereign wealth fund, a housing sector and nitely-lived households. The main
innovation of this thesis is to explicitly model the Norwegian scal rule as
a transmission channel for oil price shocks. Following higher oil prices, the
sovereign wealth fund increases, subsequently increasing the real return and fu-
ture transfers from the fund. The scal rule therefore eectively acts to trans-
form temporary oil price changes into near permanent shocks to the Norwegian
economy. The model is able to replicate key features of the Norwegian economy
during the last decade. In particular, following a strengthening in the terms
of trade, there is an increase in consumption, real wages, housing prices and
household debt levels, and the real exchange rate appreciates. There is fur-
ther a divergence in the relative prices of intermediate goods, as import prices
decrease while domestic prices increase.
Another important result is that simulations of the model reveal that mon-
etary policy is unable to stabilise the economy following oil price shocks within
a short time-horizon. This is due to its inability to aect the main transmission
mechanism, the sovereign wealth fund. Rather, to limit the eects of oil price
shocks, I suggest to transform the Norwegian scal rule. I propose a new rule
for the sovereign wealth fund, where nominal transfers from the fund grow by
the rate of productivity and prices in the economy, ensuring that transfers are
independent of the oil price and thereby eliminating the transmission channel
of oil price shocks.
For the model solving and calculations, I used Dynare 4.2.0 and Matlab
R2012a. Dynare is an open source program developed to handle a wide range
of economic models and runs in Matlab. For the construction of the correlation
matrix, table 1, I used EViews 8.
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1 Introduction
In many small open economies, primary resources constitute an essential part
of export revenues. In these economies, the high volatility of commodity prices
impacts a wide range of macroeconomic variables, creating diculties for the
conduct of optimal monetary and scal policy.
In particular, real exchange rates in small commodity-exporting economies
are often highly volatile and negatively correlated with commodity prices, see
e.g. Chen and Rogo (2003) and Cashin, Cespedes and Sahay (2004). The
literature generally explains the strong negative correlation with the Balassa-
Samuelson eect, i.e. an increase in prices implies higher productivity in the
commodity-exporting sector and tends to drive up wages in this sector, but also
in the less productive non-traded goods sector due to wage bargaining. This
results in higher prices in both sectors and subsequently a real exchange rate
appreciation. In countries with ination targeting monetary policy like Norway,
the common recommendation is to let the nominal exchange rate oat while
keeping price ination low and stable. Exchange rate uctuations, however,
aect the stability of prices and output, henceforth aecting monetary policy
decisions. For example, following a commodity price increase, economic ac-
tivity increases and the exchange rate appreciates, lowering import prices and
subsequently the consumer prices. In order to stabilise the domestic economy,
the central bank can increase the interest rate. The result is a lowering of do-
mestic economic activity, whereas the exchange rate appreciates further. The
commodity-currency eect therefore poses a problem for optimal monetary pol-
icy as it makes it dicult to simultaneously achieve both stable nominal prices
and stability in the real economy.
Fiscal policy is also aected by commodity price volatility. Resource-rich
economies often apply scal rules to shield the economy against price uncer-
tainty, to smooth consumption over time and to avoid resource-dependence. For
example, many oil exporting economies, such as Venezuela, Russia and Saudi
1
Arabia, apply dierent scal rules and have acquired sovereign wealth funds
with variable success. In Norway, a scal rule ensures that the income from
oil exports is saved in foreign assets in the Government Pension Fund - Global
(GPF), and only the expected real net return is available for government expen-
diture.1 This limits the short-run eects of oil price movements by removing
the impact of temporary uctuations on available government expenditure, but
allows for more permanent eects. When the oil price increases temporarily,
the size of the GPF increases, making future expected real returns larger. As
a result, the future expected transfers from the sovereign wealth fund increase.
In the case of the Norwegian economy, this eect has been present over the
last decade, as the oil price has been continuously increasing. Hence, although
succeeding in limiting the temporary eects of oil price changes, the Norwegian
scal rule acts to transform temporary oil price changes into nearly permanent
government income shocks.
An increase in the sovereign wealth fund also has important macroeconomic
consequences. The government can cover its expenditures either by using the
real return from the fund or by raising taxes. A larger sovereign wealth fund
therefore decreases the amount of taxes needed to sustain a given level of gov-
ernment expenditure, and implicitly raises the lifetime disposable income of
households by lowering the future tax burden. As a result, following a commod-
ity price increase and a subsequent larger sovereign wealth fund, household's
lifetime income is higher and they will subsequently increase their demand for
consumption goods and lower their supply of labour, in turn aecting consumer
prices and output, and the conduct of monetary policy. In addition, the increase
in lifetime income of households raises housing prices and the household's ability
to obtain credit. If the central banks are concerned with nancial stability, these
movements in asset prices and credit levels will increase trade-os in monetary
policy further.
1The Norwegian budgetary rule states that 4 percent (an approximation to the expected
real net return) of the Government Pension Fund should be allocated to the yearly government
budget.
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For small open economies, the terms of trade, i.e. the price of exports rel-
ative to the price of imports, is an important source of shocks to the domestic
economy. The terms of trade is strengthened if export prices increase more than
import prices, or if import prices fall more than export prices. Since the late
1990s, there has been an increase in the inow of cheap imports from low-cost
emerging economies like China, to the Western world. This fall in imported
ination has lowered consumer prices and strengthened the terms of trade. In
the case of the Norwegian economy, an increase in the oil price since 2000 has
further led to a signicant strengthening of the terms of trade. This strengthen-
ing, however, is fragile. In the case of a diminish in the inow of cheap imports
or a fall in oil prices, the eects on the Norwegian economy could be severe.
Such a reversal in the terms of trade may require a costly restructuring of the
Norwegian economy, lowering consumption and output, and lead to a fall in
the price and wage level. Due to these consequences, policy makers need to be
concerned with the possible eects of such a reversal in the terms of trade, and
seek to conduct robust scal and monetary policy.
This thesis studies the eects of terms of trade changes on a small open
resource-rich economy with a scal rule similar to the Norwegian budgetary
rule. I apply a DSGE framework with a sovereign wealth fund, a housing sector
and nitely-lived households to allow temporary wealth and income changes to
have eects on the optimal allocation of households. The main innovation of
this thesis is to model the sovereign wealth fund as a transmission channel for
oil price shocks. Following higher oil prices, the sovereign wealth fund increases,
subsequently increasing the future transfers to households from the sovereign
wealth fund. The rst key result is that the model is able to replicate key fea-
tures of the Norwegian economy during the last decade. In particular, following
a strengthening in the terms of trade, consumption, real wages, housing prices
and the level of household debt increase, the real exchange rate appreciates,
and there is a divergence in the prices of intermediate goods - import prices fall
3
while domestic prices increase.
The results also reveal that monetary policy is unable to fully stabilise the
impact of oil price changes on the Norwegian economy. Household foreign debt,
for example, continues to grow for almost 10 years following an oil price shock,
regardless of the interest rate response. In the benchmark calibration with
a exible ination targeting regime, the interest rate responses of the central
bank are limited due to the small eects on consumer prices and output. When
applying other monetary policy regimes on the model, the central bank responds
more strongly. These results show, however, that since the central bank is unable
to address the main transmission channel of oil price shock, the sovereign wealth
fund, it is unable to stabilise the economy within a short time-horizon. Rather,
to dampen the eects of oil price shocks on the Norwegian economy, I suggest
to transform the scal rule. I propose a new rule for the sovereign wealth fund,
ensuring that nominal transfers from the fund grow by the rate of price ination
and productivity and thereby neutralising the impact of oil price shocks on the
economy.
The present thesis consists of eight sections. Section 2 provides a literature
review of the DSGE literature on small open resource-rich economies. Section 3
gives a series of stylised facts of the Norwegian economy during the last decade.
The model is presented in section 4 with a benchmark calibration in section
5. In section 6, I present the results from numerical simulations of the model.
In particular, two shocks which have been important for Norwegian terms of
trade during the last decade, a positive oil price shock and a negative foreign
marginal cost shock, are discussed. Section 7 is a discussion of the results and
policy implications. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Review of the DSGE Literature on Small Open
Economies
Although commodity price uctuations are an important source of volatility
in small open economies, it has been virtually ignored by the DSGE literature
on small open economies. The work of Obstfeld and Rogo (1996), however,
has inspired a growing interest in studying monetary and scal policy in open
economies with more general price frictions. They build a bridge between the
intertemporal approach of, for example, Obstfeld (1982) and the classic contri-
butions of Fleming (1962), Mundell (1963), and Dornbusch (1976), and develop
a tractable two-country model with monopolistic power and sticky prices to ad-
dress global macroeconomic dynamics. Their model, however, does not capture
the eects of foreign price impulses to the domestic economy. Instead, most
of the open economy literature following Obstfeld and Rogo (1996) has ap-
plied various versions of two-country models with strategic interactions in order
to address the eects of international welfare spillovers of monetary and scal
policy, in particular the xed vs. oating debate on exchange rates, see e.g.
Obstfeld and Rogo (2002).
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework has been
applied to open economy macroeconomics since the seminal work of Gal and
Monacelli (2005). They build a tractable two-country small open economy
model of global interactions with Calvo sticky prices and analyse the conduct
of Taylor rules for monetary policy, showing in particular that monetary policy
rules dier in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility they entail.
A small branch of the literature has explicitly included commodity prices in
this DSGE framework. The work of Backus and Crucini (2000) are one of the
precursors to this literature. They build a dynamic general equilibrium model
and show how oil price uctuations accounts for a large share of terms of trade
volatility since the Bretton Woods system ended in 1971, and subsequently that
a large share of business cycle volatility can be explained by movements in the
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oil price. Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011) build a DSGE model in which
the price of oil is endogenous. They demonstrate that higher oil prices generate
a reallocation of wealth between oil exporting and oil importing economies, an
eect which may account for a consumption decline and an exchange rate depre-
ciation of oil importing economies. Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011) also show
that monetary policy play a limited role in shaping the response of economic
activity following oil price uctuations in the world economy. As a consequence
of their work, a growing literature focus on optimal monetary policy responses
to oil price uctuations for oil-importing economies and on the eects on the
economy of oil as an input factor in production, see e.g. Bodenstein, Guerrieri
and Kilian (2012) and Van Robays (2012).
The model literature on the eects of commodity price changes for small
open resource-rich economies is very limited. Charnavoki (2009) and Charna-
voki (2010) address the question of optimal monetary policy in a DSGE model,
focusing on the classical question of xed vs. exible exchange rates with spe-
cial emphasis on international risk sharing. He argues that exible nominal ex-
change rates are not necessarily optimal in a model with complete international
risk sharing. Hevia and Nicolini (2013) build a DSGE model with the purpose
of analysing the eects of commodity price changes in small open resource-rich
economies. They focus on the eects of price movements on the relative produc-
tivity of the commodity sector, aecting the economy through wage formation.
They are able to reproduce the strong co-movements between nominal exchange
rates and the price of exports. Optimal monetary policy responses to commod-
ity price uctuations for oil exporting economies have, to my knowledge, so far
not been addressed in the literature.
Although the model literature has provided a limited focus on small open
resource-rich economies, the empirical literature has addressed the importance
of oil price movements on business cycle uctuations in oil exporting economies.
First of all, many empirical investigations show that oil price hikes entail a
lowering of global economic activity, see e.g. Jimenez-Rodrguez and Sanchez
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(2005) and Bjrnland (2009). Jimenez-Rodrguez and Sanchez (2005) analyse
the eect of oil price increases on GDP in OECD countries. Two of the countries
in the sample were oil exporters (Norway and United Kingdom). Interestingly,
the two economies experience opposite eects from an oil price rise. While
Norwegian GDP grows, UK output falls. The authors argue that the relative
size of the exchange rate appreciation might be an explanatory factor as the
sterling exchange rate appreciated considerably more than the Norwegian krone.
This suggests that the exchange rate response might be a crucial component in
understanding the propagation of oil price shocks on the economy.
Some papers indicate that the response of the Norwegian exchange rate to
oil price uctuations is limited (e.g. Bjrnland (2009)), several papers, on the
other hand, have presented evidence for a contradictory interpretation, see e.g.
Haldane (1997), Solheim (2008) and Akram (2004). In particular, Akram (2004)
analyses the Norwegian exchange rate in a fundamental equilibrium exchange
rate (FEER) framework. He focuses on the eect the sizeable position of Nor-
wegian net foreign assets could have on the exchange rate when high net foreign
wealth is associated with a strong real exchange rate. The importance of net
foreign wealth suggests that the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund could be an
important transmission channel from oil price movements to the exchange rate
in Norway.
Furthermore, Bjrnland (2009) uses a VAR approach to analyse the eects of
oil price shocks on the Norwegian economy. She nds that asset prices, ination
and the interest rate increase following an oil price shock. Moreover, Bjrnland
and Jacobsen (2010) show how housing price movements are an important part
of the transmission mechanism in the Norwegian economy. These papers in-
dicate that the asset and housing markets could be important components in
understanding how oil aects the economy.
The empirical literature on Norway emphasises the importance of exchange
rates, net foreign wealth and asset prices for the transmission of oil price shocks
to the domestic economy. This thesis addresses these issues by constructing a
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tractable model of the Norwegian economy with an oil sector, a sovereign wealth
fund and a housing sector modelled explicitly.
3 Stylised Facts of the Norwegian Economy Dur-
ing the last Decade
This section presents a series of stylised facts for the eects of terms of trade
changes on the Norwegian economy. Oil is the major export commodity in Nor-
way, making up about 1=5 of Norwegian GDP and 1=2 of exports.2 Government
revenue from the oil sector in Norway is saved in the Government Pension Fund
- Global (GPF) and invested in foreign assets. Since 2004, the GPF has grown
almost ve-fold and is at present worth more than 5 000 billion NOK (about
800 billion USD and 5=3 of GDP).
Because oil is such a large share of the Norwegian GDP, oil price uctuations
evidently have important consequences for the Norwegian economy and the
Norwegian terms of trade. The oil price has increased signicantly during the
last decade, from around 30 dollars in 2004 to more than 100 dollars in 2013, see
gure 1. Additionally, since the late 1990s, there has been an inow of low-cost
products from emerging economies into the Norwegian economy. For example,
the liberalisation of trade in clothing following the establishment of WTO in
1994 has been succeeded by increases in clothing imports from cheaper countries
(see Moe (2002)). The increased inow of goods from China, in particular, which
joined the WTO in 2001, has had a marked impact on import prices. This
has lowered prices on imports signicantly compared to domestically produced
goods, see gure 2. The combination of high oil prices and low import prices has
led to a strengthening in the Norwegian terms of trade during the last decade,
see gure 3. It is particularly noteworthy that movements in the terms of trade
are dominated by oil price movements. Hence, in the Norwegian empirical
2Statistics Norway, National accounts 2012 (https://www.ssb.no/en/nasjonalregnskap-og-
konjunkturer/statistikker/knr)
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Figure 1: The Oil Price. US dollar per barrel. 1990 Q1 - 2013 Q2
Source: Thomson Reuters
literature, the oil price is often used as a proxy for the terms of trade.
Although the Norwegian budgetary rule seeks to limit the impact of terms
of trade changes, the strong terms of trade has aected the Norwegian economy
in a wide variety of dimensions. A stronger terms of trade makes imports cheap
relative to exports. As a result, households can purchase more imports for the
same amount of exports. Furthermore, increased export earnings and lower
import prices generally lead to higher real wages. During the last decade, real
wages, consumption and imports in Norway have increased strongly while non-
oil exports have stagnated, accompanying the strengthening of the terms of
trade.
There has also been a stark increase in real housing prices and households
credit, which can be related to the strengthening of the terms of trade. A
stronger terms of trade increases household lifetime income and wealth through
the eects on consumer prices and real wages. As a result, households have
easier access to credit, allowing them to buy more housing and assets. Although
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Figure 2: The price level of domestically produced and imported goods and
services. Index. 1990 Q1 = 100. 1980 Q1 - 2013 Q2
Source: Statistics Norway
Figure 3: The Norwegian terms of trade. Calculated as log of export prices
divided by import prices and normalised to 2000 Q1 = 0. 2000 Q1 - 2013 Q3
Source: Statistics Norway
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Figure 4: The oil price, housing prices and credit to GDP ratio. The oil price
and housing prices are index series with 2000 Q1 = 100. 2000 Q1 - 2013 Q2
Sources: Norges Eiendomsmeglerforbund, Thomson Reuters and Statistics Nor-
way
other factors, such as the banking system and global access to credit, may be
other possible explanatory factors, it seems plausible that oil prices aect both
housing prices and credit levels. Figure 4 suggests the existence of a positive
correlation between the oil price, housing prices and the credit to GDP ratio.
Table 1 presents a summary of the correlations between the oil price and a
series of macroeconomic variables using Norwegian quarterly data between 2000
Q1 and 2013 Q3. Contemporaneously, the oil price is positively correlated with
output, consumption, credit and housing prices, while it is negatively correlated
with the nominal exchange rate. The correlation table also seems to indicate
that the oil price is leading GDP and credit, a result of the stimulating impulse a
higher oil price has on the Norwegian economy. The oil price is, however, lagging
consumption and housing prices. The lag structure between housing and the oil
price might be explained with the 2008 nancial crisis where housing prices fell
before the actual outbreak of nancial distress. Using a sample excluding the
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Figure 5: The oil price and the exchange rate. Four-quarter change. Percent.
2004 Q1 - 2013 Q3.
Sources: Norges Bank and Thomson Reuters
Table 1: Correlations between macroeconomic variables and the oil price. The
correlations are calculated using HP-ltered quarterly data with  = 1600 from
2000Q1 to 2013Q3.
Sources: Norges Bank and Statistics Norway
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Oil Price -0.09 0.18 0.66 1.00 0.66 0.18 -0.09
GDP 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.22
Consumption 0.22 0.49 0.67 0.60 0.37 0.11 -0.07
Nominal Exchange rate -0.03 -0.24 -0.52 -0.62 -0.28 0.19 0.40
Credit -0.03 0.08 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.22
Housing prices 0.36 0.42 0.51 0.47 0.20 -0.01 -0.01
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recent nancial crisis indicates that the oil price is leading housing prices. The
statistical properties of the estimates, however, are weak. Hence, only broad
qualitative implications might be drawn from the correlation table.
4 The Model
Based on the stylised facts presented in the previous section, it seems evident
that changes in the terms of trade have eects on the Norwegian economy. The
model literature, however, has not yet addressed this aspect fully; there exists
very few models where foreign price impulses matter. The direct impact from
foreign prices on domestic prices and GDP matters for the conduct of monetary
policy. In addition, the oil price correlates with credit and housing prices -
factors that matter for the stability of the banking system. To the extent that
central banks care about nancial fragility in their monetary policy decisions,
the eects of terms of trade movements on the nancial sector are important
for optimal monetary policy. In this section, I develop a DSGE model where
foreign price impulses are modelled explicitly, focusing on oil price shocks and
import price shocks. The model provides a tractable framework to analyse the
eects of foreign price changes on small open resource-rich economies.
The model is built on a DSGE framework which is extended to incorpo-
rate overlapping generations, a housing sector, a government sector with a
sovereign wealth fund and income from oil exports, and an exchange rate mar-
ket. The economy consists of six types of agents: (i) nitely-lived households,
(ii) perfectly competitive life-insurance companies, (iii) perfectly competitive
nal goods rms, (iv) a continuum of rms producing dierentiated intermedi-
ate goods and setting nominal prices in a staggered fashion, (v) the monetary
authority, and (vi) a government sector, which owns the natural resource and
distributes the real return to households. In addition, there are foreign inter-
mediate goods rms and foreign nal goods rms trading with the domestic
economy.
13
4.1 Households
The individual households in the economy are described by a stochastic discrete-
time version of Yaari-Blanchard (Blanchard, 1984; Yaari, 1965) households, i.e.
nitely-lived households with no intergenerational bequest motive, and are ex-
tended to include endogenous labour supply, a housing sector and the holding
of foreign bonds.
The economy is populated by forward-looking households with identical pref-
erences who face a constant probability of death in each time period. The pop-
ulation is assumed to be constant over time and normalised to one, implicitly
assuming that birth and death rates are equal in each period. Since the prob-
ability of death is constant, the expected lifetime of any household is 1 .
3 Note
that if  ! 0, the expected lifetime is 1 ! 1, i.e. the limit case is an innite
lifetime household.
A perfectly competitive life insurance market is assumed to operate, sim-
ilar to Blanchard (1984) and Yaari (1965). The insurance companies collect
nancial wealth from the deceased and pay a fair premium to survivors. The
zero prot condition in the insurance market requires that all collected wealth
is redistributed to the survivors in equal proportions.
4.1.1 Individual Optimisation
Individual households face a stochastic sequence of prices, interest rates and
prot shares, and decide on the future time path of consumption, housing,
labour supply and wealth accumulation. Labour yields direct dis-utility and
housing yields direct utility. Furthermore, housing is an asset in the economy
and it allows agents to save between periods. The housing stock depreciates each
year by h. There are complete markets in the economy and there exist two risk-
free bonds: (i) domestic bonds in zero net supply and (ii) foreign bonds. Foreign
bonds are assumed to be in innite supply since the economy is assumed to be
3The expected lifetime is the sum of the series
P1
t=1 t(1  )t 1 = +2(1  )+3(1 
)2 + ::: = 1
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small relative to the world market. Total non-human wealth therefore consists
of housing, domestic bonds and foreign bonds.
The objective of the individual household j belonging to the generation born
at time s  0 is to maximise the expected lifetime utility function:
E0
1X
t=0
[(1  )]tU(Cs;t(j);Hs;t(j); Ns;t(j)) (1)
where  2 (0; 1] is the discount factor, Cs;t(j) is consumption of the nal good,
Hs;t(j) is consumption of housing and Ns;t(j) denotes the amount of labour
provided by household j.
The ow budget constraint at time t for the individual household j born at
time s and owning a life insurance is:4
Cs;t(j) +Bs;t(j) + StB

s;t(j) + Ph;tHs;t(j) 
Ph;tHs;t 1(j)(1  h)
1   +
Rt 1Bs;t 1(j)
t(1  ) +
StR

t 1B

s;t 1(j)
t (1  )
+
WtNs;t(j) +Divs;t(j) + Ts;t(j)
(2)
The individual income side of equation (2) is composed of non-human wealth
from period t   1 and income in period t. Individual non-human wealth is the
sum of the present value of housing assets, Ph;tHs;t 1, depreciated by h, risk-
free domestic bonds,
Rt 1Bs;t 1(j)
t
, and risk-free foreign bonds,
StR

t 1B

s;t 1(j)
t
.
St is the real exchange rate, Rt 1 and Rt 1 are the gross nominal interest rate on
domestic bonds and foreign bonds, respectively, and t and 

t denote the gross
domestic and gross foreign ination rate of consumption goods, respectively.
The insurance market acts to discount assets by the factor (1   ), i.e. if the
household survives to period t it also receives its fair share of the capital of
deceased households through the insurance market. For the rest of this thesis,
As;t is used to denote the sum of non-human wealth at time t. Income in each
period is the sum of wage income, Ws;tNs;t(j), dividends from the ownership
4See appendix A for the derivation of the budget constraint for Yaari-Blanchard households.
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of domestic intermediate rms, Divs;t(j), and transfers from the government,
Ts;t(j).
The expenditure side of the ow budget constraint of individual households is
the sum of consumption, Cs;t(j), savings in domestic and foreign bonds, Bs;t(j)
and Bs;t(j), and housing, Hs;t(j). All prices are real and the common numeraire
is the price of consumption goods in the domestic market.
An optimal consumption plan for the individual household j of generation
s is described by the initial set fCs;0(j); Bs;0(j); Bs;0(j);Hs;0(j); Ns;0(j)g and
the sequence of contingency plans fCs;t(j); Bs;t(j); Bs;t(j);Hs;t(j); Ns;t(j)g1t=1,
given initial wealth As;0(j) and the stochastic sequences fDivs;t(j); Ts;t(j); Rt;
Rt ;Wtg1t=0 whose exogenously given probability distributions are known by all
households.5 For the sake of simplicity, newly born agents hold no nancial
assets and prot shares are age-independent.
The rest of this thesis focuses on the instantaneous separable utility function:
U(Cs;t(j);Hs;t(j); Ns;t(j)) = log(Cs;t(j)) + log(Hs;t(j))  Ns;t(j)
1+
1 + 
(3)
The given utility function is chosen for two reasons. First, it satises the
assumptions of concavity in all arguments and non-satiation. Second, the log
formulation in consumption is important in order to derive a tractable analytical
solution to the model.6 Furthermore, exponential smoothing and time separa-
ble utility implies time consistent behaviour. The log formulation on housing
and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) formulation on labour are used for
simplicity.
The household maximises the expected lifetime utility presented in equation
(1) subject to the ow budget constraint given in equation (2) and a transver-
5The probability distributions are assumed to be known by all agents in the economy to
avoid market failures arising from information asymmetries. Furthermore, it allows agents to
optimise under rational expectations.
6In particular, an analytical solution to the dynamic consumption equation hinges on the
assumption of log utility in consumption.
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sality condition which precludes Ponzi games:
lim
T!1
Etf[(1  )]T t 1
Rt;T
As;T (j)g = 0 (4)
where Rt;T =
QT
k=tRt is the product of all interest rates from period t to period
T and As;T (j) is the level of non-human wealth in period T .
7
The solution to the household maximisation problem yields the following
necessary rst order conditions:8
1 = RtEt[
Cs;t(j)
Cs;t+1(j)
1
t+1
] (5)
Wt = Cs;t(j)N

s;t (6)
Cs;t(j) = Ph;tHt(j)  Etf 1
Rt
Ph;t+1Ht(j)(1  h)t+1g (7)
where equation (5) is the stochastic euler equation and equation (6) is the
intratemporal optimality condition for the optimal choice of consumption and
labour. Equation (7) is the dynamic housing equation, illustrating the choice
between consumption and housing in period t. Note that housing yields both
direct utility today and wealth income which allows consumption tomorrow.
Hence, the dynamic housing equation contains both an intratemporal and an
intertemporal choice.
The stochastic discount factor of household j of generation s is dened as
individual valuation of future consumption relative to consumption today and
is given by:
Dt;t+1(s; j) = Etf Cs;t(j)
Cs;t+1(j)
1
t+1
g (8)
7Equation (4) has to be satised in order to obtain a interior optimum to the optimisation
problem.
8The problem has been solved as a Kuhn-Tucker optimisation problem with time-varying
coecients.
17
A combination of equation (5) and equation (8) gives:
Dt;t+1(s; j) = Etf 1
Rt
g (9)
Equation (9) shows how the individual valuation of future consumption rel-
ative to consumption today corresponds to the expected interest rate in the
economy, i.e. individual discounting is the same as discounting by the expected
risk-free interest rate.
A key component of the model is to allow for temporary wealth and income
changes to have eects on the optimal allocation of households. The limited
lifetime of households allows for such eects because households are reluctant
to pass away with positive wealth and are therefore more concerned about the
near-future relative to the far-o future. By iterating the budget constraint
forward, using equation (5) and equation (7), and imposing the transversality
condition, the individual dynamic consumption is given as:9
Ct = (1  (1  ))[
StR

t 1Bs;t 1(j)
t
+ Is;t(j) +H
HH
s;t (j)] (10)
where Is;t(j) is human wealth, dened as the expected present discounted value
of future labour incomes, prot shares and transfers from the government for
household j:
Is;t(j) = Et
1X
T=t
(1  )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
[WtNs;T (j) +Divs;T (j) + Ts;T (j)]
= Et
1X
T=t
(1  )T tDt;T
t;T
[WtNs;T (j) +Divs;T (j) + Ts;T (j)]
(11)
where the second equality follows from uncovered interest parity. HHHs;t (j) is
expected future housing income for individual households:
9See appendix B for a detailed description of the steps leading to equation (10).
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HHHs;t (j) = Et
1X
T=t
(1  )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
[
PH;THs;T 1(j)(1  h)
1     Ph;THs;T (j)]
Et
1X
T=t
(1  )T tDt;T
t;T
[
PH;THs;T 1(j)(1  h)
1     Ph;THs;T (j)]
(12)
There are now four equations describing the optimal behaviour of individual
households, (i) the budget constraint given by equation (2), (ii) the intratem-
poral optimality condition for labour given by equation (6), (iii) the dynamic
housing equation given by equation (7), and (iv) the individual dynamic con-
sumption equation given by equation (10). These equations provide the descrip-
tion of the demand side of the economy at the individual level.
4.1.2 Aggregation
In the previous section, I derived the individual optimality conditions. However,
to allow for macro-economic modelling, the aggregate versions of the equations
are needed. The aggregate value Qt at time t of a general economic variable
Qs;t(j) is obtained as a sum across the living households in each cohort:
10
Qt =
tX
s= 1
(1  )t sQs;t(j) (13)
Aggregation of all generations alive at time t yields the following expres-
sions for the ow budget constraint, the rst order conditions and the dynamic
consumption equations, respectively:11
10Equation (13) is composed of three parts: Qs;t(j) is the value of the given variable of
each agent in cohort s, (1 )t s is the number of remaining households from cohort s, whilePt
s= 1 is sum over all cohorts which have existed up to time t. Hence, equation (13) is the
sum of the variable across all living households.
11The budget constraint now holds with equality due to the non-satiation property of the
household utility function.
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Ct + Ph;tHt +BHH;t + StB

HH;t
= Ph;tHt 1(1  h) + BHH;t 1Rt 1
t
+
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
+WtNt +Divt + Tt
(14)
Wt = CtN

t (15)
Ct = Ph;tHt   EtfDt;t+1Ph;t+1Ht(1  h)
t+1
g (16)
Ct = [1  (1  )][
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
+ It] (17)
where It denotes aggregate human wealth and is dened by It = Et
P1
T=t[(1 
)]T t Dt;Tt;T (WTNT +DivT + TT ) and B

HH;t is the ownership of foreign bonds
by households in the economy at time t. Using equations (14), (16) and (17)
above, I obtain the following dynamic equation for aggregate consumption:12
Ct =
1  
 + (1  )2EtfDt;t+1t+1Ct+1g+ 
(1  (1  ))
 + (1  )2
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
(18)
This dynamic consumption equation is the key component in the model for
including wealth and income eects in the economy. In the case of nite lifetime
(  0), the time path of consumption depends on the aggregate level of non-
human wealth. Note that in the case of innite lifetime ( = 0), equation (18)
is reduced to the standard intertemporal Euler equation. Furthermore, note
that housing has no eect on the time path of aggregate dynamic consumption.
This follows from the assumptions of constant population and equal preferences
implying that the aggregate household sector in the economy has to buy and
sell all houses in each period. Therefore, an increase in housing prices will in
12See Appendix C for a detailed description of the steps leading to equation (18).
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the aggregate lead to more non-human wealth from the previous period, but
also to more expensive housing to be bought today and has no eect on total
non-human wealth. This corresponds to Buiter (2008)'s notion that 'housing
wealth isn't wealth.'
4.2 Firms
The supply side of the economy is based on the DSGE model used by Norges
Bank and documented in Brubakk et al. (2006). There are two types of rms,
(i) nal goods rms producing in competitive markets with exible prices, and
(ii) intermediate goods rms selling goods under monopolistic competition with
sticky prices. The intermediate goods sector can either export its goods or sell to
the domestic nal goods rms, whereas the nal goods rms can either import
intermediate goods from abroad or purchase from the domestic intermediate
goods rm.
4.2.1 Final Goods Firms
Final goods rms are identical and produce under competitive markets without
any frictions. As a result, the sector can be described by a representative rm.
The representative nal goods rm is assumed to produce by a CES production
function:
Yt = (
1
Q
1  1
t + (1  )
1
M
1  1
t )

 1 (19)
where Yt is the amount of nal goods, Qt is the amount of domestic intermediate
goods used in production,Mt is the amount of imported intermediate goods used
in production,  measures the steady-state share of domestic intermediates if
relative prices are equal to 1 and  is the elasticity of substitution between
foreign and domestic intermediate goods in production of nal goods. The
rm operates under competitive markets and therefore acts as a price-taker in
the economy. All prices in the model are real prices, using the price of the
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consumption good (nal good) as the numeraire. Prot maximisation given the
real prices of the two inputs yields two demand equations:
Qt = P
 
Q;tYt (20)
and
Mt = (1  )P M;tYt (21)
where PQ;t is the real price of domestic intermediate goods and PM;t is the real
price of imported goods in domestic prices.
In addition, following competitive markets, we have the zero prot condition
which implies that the real value of produced goods must be equal to the real
value of input:
Yt = PQ;tQt + PM;tMt (22)
4.2.2 Domestic Intermediate Goods Firms
Each domestic intermediate goods rm, i, is producing a dierentiated good
Y 0t (i) using the linear production function:
Y 0t (i) = ZtNt(i) (23)
where Zt is labour productivity and Nt(i) is the amount of labour used in pro-
duction. Labour productivity is assumed to be equal across rms and follow a
predetermined growth path. Hence, the variation of intermediate goods produc-
tion around a trend only depends on the amount of labour used in production.
Given that labour is the only input in production and the real wage rate of the
economy is Wt, the real marginal cost is:
MCt(i) =Wt(i) (24)
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Firms sell their goods under monopolistic competition to both domestic nal
good producers and nal good producers abroad. A quadratic cost of changing
prices is assumed, implying that larger changes in prices cost more on the margin
(Rotemberg, 1982). Hence, rms are reluctant to adjust its prices and this cost
increases with the change in price in a quadratic fashion. The cost enters the
rm's maximisation problem and is described by:
PQt (i) =
PQ
2
[
PQ;t(i)=PQ;t 1
PQ;t 1=PQ;t 2
  1]2 (25)
for domestic prices of goods and
PM

t (i) =
PM

2
[
PM;t(i)=PM;t 1
PM;t 1=PM;t 2
  1]2 (26)
for exported goods, where PQ and PM

are the main parameters of price
stickiness, determining the cost of changing prices for domestic and exported
goods, respectively. A higher  will increase the cost of adjusting prices, thus
making rms more reluctant to alter its prices, resulting in more sticky prices
in the economy. The costs of changing prices is assumed to enter the rm
maximisation problem as an intangible dis-utility.13
The dividends are given as the sum of revenue from domestic sales and
exports minus wage costs. Each period, the dividend is being paid to households
and is given by:
Divt(i) = PQ;t(i)Qt(i) + StPM;t  (i)Mt (i) WtNt(i) (27)
The rms operate under monopolistic competition with sticky prices. As
a result, the intermediate goods rms are price setters in the economy. They
choose labour inputs,14 the domestic price and export price in order to maximise
the present discounted value of prots. The aggregate rst order conditions for
13I.e. the cost of changing prices is an intangible cost and does not enter the cash-ows of
the economy.
14by prot maximisation.
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optimal price setting are:15
PQ;t = 
MCt
Zt
[(   1) + PQ Q;t
Q;t 1
(
Q;t
Q;t 1
  1)
 PQEtfDt;t+1Qt+1
Qt
Q;t+1
Q;t+1
Q;t
(
Q;t+1
Q;t
  1)g] 1
(28)
and
PM;t = 
MCt
ZtSt
[(   1) + PM M;t
M;t 1
(
M;t
M;t 1
  1)
 PMEtfDt;t+1
St+1M

t+1
StMt
t+1
t+1
M;t+1
M;t+1
M;t
(
M;t+1
M;t
  1)g] 1
(29)
Here,  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign sales
of intermediate goods. The price mark-up under monopolistic competition is
given by  1 . The price setting equations for period t both consists of three
parts, (i) price setting under exible prices and monopolistic competition, (ii)
the cost of changing the ination rate from period t   1 to period t, and (iii)
the expected discounted cost of changing the ination rate from t to t+1. The
rst order conditions reect the optimal way of weighting these costs together.
The foreign economy is assumed to have similar technologies as the domestic
economy. Hence, the foreign nal goods rm has the same type of demand
equations as the domestic nal goods rm, and the foreign intermediate goods
rms set their prices in the same manner as the domestic intermediate goods
rms.
4.3 The Government Sector
A key contribution of this thesis is to add a government sector which admin-
isters the natural resource in the economy, assumed to be oil to resemble the
Norwegian economy. The oil is assumed to be purely an endowment with no
15See appendix D for the full derivation of the rst order conditions for the intermediate
goods rms.
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cost of extraction. In each period, the government sells all it can extract, Xt,
in the international market at the real foreign market price, PX;t. The rate of
extraction is assumed to be exogenous and increase with labour productivity in
the economy. The real prots from the resource extraction is then given by:
DivG;t = StPX;tXt (30)
All prot from the sale of the natural resource is placed in a sovereign wealth
fund that invests in foreign risk-free bonds. The government is assumed to follow
a scal rule similar to the Norwegian budgetary rule, hence only the real return
of the fund is available to cover government expenditures each period. Since
the government in this economy has no expenditures to be paid, the real return
is distributed to the households as a lump sum transfer each period. Note that
if the government had expenditures to cover, the transfers from the fund would
still be a transfer to households by lowering their tax burden. The transfer to
households in period t is then given by:
Tt = St
(Rt 1   1)
t
BG;t 1 (31)
where BG;t 1 is the amount of foreign bonds owned by the sovereign wealth
fund at time t   1. By combining equation (30) and equation (31), the law of
motion for the assets in the sovereign wealth fund is given by:
StB

G;t = St
Rt 1B

G;t 1
t
+DivG;t   Tt = St
BG;t 1
t
+ StPX;tXt (32)
Hence, the sovereign wealth fund grows with the income from the sale of
the natural resource in each period.16 Notice that this implies that the fund
will grow to innity when t ! 1. In a DSGE-model, this will simply result
in all variables growing to innity, arguably an impossible and uninteresting
16Assuming that foreign consumer price ination is exogenous and equal to 1.
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situation. In order to make the sovereign wealth fund stationary, the rate of
extraction is assumed to grow by the growth rate of labour productivity in the
economy. This allows a steady-state solution to exist where the real prots from
selling oil is equal to the labour productivity discount on the sovereign wealth
fund. The stationary version of equation (32) is presented in section 4.7.
4.4 The Foreign Exchange Market and the Risk Premium
Households have the opportunity of investing in foreign and domestic bonds.
The optimal allocation between the two bonds denes the interest rates and the
exchange rate for which there is no arbitrage in the bond market.
St = St+1
Rt
Rt
t+1
t+1
ut (33)
where ut is an endogenous risk premium. In open economy innite horizon
DSGE-models, there is a need for closing the model by introducing an extra
equation. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), an endogenous risk pre-
mium is one of several ways of closing open economy macro-models. The risk
premium is assumed to depend on the amount of foreign bonds owned by the
agents of the economy as a fraction of the steady-state level:
ut = e
 ( B

t
Bss
 1)
(34)
Hence, if the agents in the domestic economy own more foreign bonds than
the steady-state level, the risk premium will be lower and agents can borrow
cheaper abroad than in the steady-state solution.  ( 0) is a parameter de-
noting the degree of impact from bond holdings on the risk premium and Bss is
the steady-state level of foreign bonds owned by all agents in the economy, Bt .
The latter is given by the sum of foreign assets held by the government and the
households:
Bt = B

G;t +B

HH;t (35)
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4.5 Market Clearing
All factor and goods markets must clear in equilibrium. For the nal good, this
implies that all produced nal goods must be consumed at time t:
Yt = Ct (36)
For the intermediate good, market clearing implies that all goods produced
are sold, either domestically or in the foreign market:
Y 0t = Qt +M

t (37)
For domestic bonds, there is zero net supply, i.e.
Bt = 0 (38)
while in the foreign bond market, the economy is assumed to be small compared
to the foreign market. Hence, the supply of foreign risk-free bonds is in innite
supply. The law of motion for foreign bonds can be derived by applying the
budget constraint (equation (14)), replacing for the transfers from the sovereign
wealth fund from equation (32) and using the prot equations from the inter-
mediate and nal goods sector (equations (27) and (22)). The law of motion for
the ownership of foreign bonds by the domestic economy is then given by:
Bt =
Rt 1B

t 1
t
+ PX;tXt + PM;tM

t  
PM;t
St
Mt (39)
The trade balance is dened as PX;tXt + PM;tM

t   PM;tSt Mt. Hence, total
ownership of foreign assets in the economy evolves with the trade balance. A
surplus on the trade balance implies an increase in net foreign assets.
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4.6 Monetary Policy
To close the model, a monetary policy framework is needed. The monetary
policy makers are assumed to conduct optimal monetary policy according to a
exible ination targeting regime. A exible ination targeting regime implies
that the central bank is concerned with both consumer price ination and the
output in the economy. To solve for optimal monetary policy, a loss function is
applied, reecting an approximation to the welfare function of an economy with
price stickiness.
I apply a loss function similar to the one used by Norges Bank. The loss
function is specied in gaps, which are dened as percentage deviations from
steady-state values. The period for period loss function is then given by:
L(t) =
1
2
(^2t + y^
2
t + r(Rt  Rt 1)2) (40)
A positive ination gap, ^t, implies ination above the steady-state level.
The output gap, y^t, is dened as deviation from steady-state output for main-
land Norway.17 In addition to ination and output, there is a smoothing term
in the loss function for the nominal interest rate, (Rt  Rt 1), adding a cost to
large changes in the interest rate and resulting in smooth interest rate paths.
 and r are parameters describing the relative weights in the loss function
and are set to 0:5 and 0:05, respectively, approximately the same as the loss
function of Norges Bank.18 All terms in the loss function are squared to ensure
that both positive and negative deviations from steady-state are costly for the
central bank.
Subsequently, the central bank chooses a path for the key policy rate by
minimising the loss function. Monetary policy is assumed to be conducted under
discretion, implying that the central bank re-optimise its monetary policy each
17The dierence between mainland output and output is rather trivial since oil production
is xed in the model economy. Hence, the dierence only materialises in the relative size of
the eects.
18See Norges Bank Monetary Policy Report 3/11, p. 15 and Norges Bank Monetary Policy
Report 1/12, p. 15-16.
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4.7 The Stationary Solution
To allow for a stationary solution to the model, the law of motion for the
sovereign wealth fund has to be stationary. All aggregate equations are there-
fore de-trended by labour productivity, Zt. The adjusted variables are denoted
by small letters. The growth rate of labour productivity is assumed to be con-
stant and equal to g. The rest of this section presents the stationary equations
of the model:
The intratemporal optimal labour-consumption choice:
wt = ctN

t (41)
The dynamic optimal housing equation:
ct = Ph;t   EtfDt;t+1Ph;t+1t+1(1  h)(1 + g)g (42)
The dynamic consumption equation:
ct =
1  
 + (1  )2EtfDt;t+1ct+1t+1(1 + g)g
+
(1  (1  ))
 + (1  )2
StR

t 1b

HH;t 1
t (1 + g)
(43)
The nal goods rm production function:
ct = (
1
 q
1  1
t + (1  )
1
m
1  1
t )

 1 (44)
19The monetary policy literature often assume commitment, arguably an unrealistic as-
sumption for most countries. I assume discretion here to more realistically represent monetary
policy in practice.
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The demand for domestic intermediate goods from the nal goods rm:
qt = (PQ;t)
 ct (45)
The demand for imported intermediate goods from the nal goods rm:
mt = (1  )(PM;t) ct (46)
The domestic intermediate goods rms production function:
y0t = Nt = qt +m

t (47)
The marginal costs of domestic intermediate goods rms:
mct = wt (48)
The domestic intermediate goods price setting equation in the domestic market:
PQ;t = mct[(   1) + PQ Q;t
Q;t 1
(
Q;t
Q;t 1
  1)
 PQEtfDt;t+1 qt+1(1 + g)
qt
Q;t+1
Q;t+1
Q;t
(
Q;t+1
Q;t
  1)g] 1
(49)
The domestic intermediate goods price setting equation in the export market:
PM;t = 
mct
St
[(   1) + PM M
;t
M;t 1
(
M;t
M;t 1
  1)
 PMEtfDt;t+1
St+1m

t+1
Stmt
t+1(1 + g)
t+1
M;t+1
M;t+1
M;t
(
M;t+1
M;t
  1)g] 1
(50)
The price setting equation of foreign intermediate goods rm in the domestic
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import market:
PM;t = 
mctSt[(
   1) + PM M;t
M;t 1
(
M;t
M;t 1
  1)
 PMEtfDt;t+1StMt+1
St+1Mt
t+1
t+1
M;t+1
M;t+1(1 + g
)
M;t
(
M;t+1
M;t
  1)g] 1
(51)
The demand for exported intermediate goods:
mt = 
(PM;t) 

yt (52)
The law of motion of the sovereign wealth fund:
bG;t =
bG;t 1
t (1 + g)
+ PX;txt (53)
The exchange rate market:
St = St+1
Rt
Rt
t+1
t+1
e
 ( b

t
b
SS
 1)
(54)
The current account equation:
bt =
Rt 1b

t 1
t (1 + g)
+ PX;txt + PM;tm

t  
PM;t
St
mt (55)
In order to use the complete stationary model for policy analysis, the nu-
merical values of the free parameters have to be set.
5 Parametrisation
In this section, I document the calibration of the steady-state and dynamic
parameters in the model. The parametrisation in this thesis is based on a
combination of estimated parameters from the empirical literature, common
values in the model literature and calibration to match dynamic features of the
data.
There are two kinds of parameters in the model, steady-state parameters
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and dynamic parameters. The steady-state parameters are calibrated so as to
match empirically estimated parameters and long-run ratios in the Norwegian
economy. The dynamic parameters matter for the impulse responses in the
model and are calibrated to match dynamic results from empirical estimates of
the Norwegian economy. The goal has been to produce the true parametrisation
of the Norwegian economy, and the result is arguably a reasonable parametri-
sation which allows a discussion of the qualitative results from the model.
5.1 Steady-state Parameters
The steady-state parameters in the model are: , , g, R, R, , , , , ,
, , h,  and 
. The gross ination rate for both domestic () and foreign
() ination are set to 1 to allow for tractability of the model for a diverse range
of countries. The constant growth rate of labour productivity, g, is set to 0:004
per quarter to match the average rate of labour productivity growth for the
Norwegian economy between 1990 and 2012 (Hagelund (2009) and OECD20).
Both the domestic and foreign gross nominal interest rate are set to match a
long-run real interest rate of 4 percent.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediate
goods in the production of nal consumption goods, , typically ranges be-
tween 0:5 and 2 in the business cycle literature, see e.g. Chetty et al. (2011).
For the Norwegian economy, a value of the elasticity in the low range is proba-
bly appropriate due to the relative specialisation of the Norwegian production
structure. Naug (2002) uses Norwegian data and nds the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestically-produced and imported goods in the production of
nal goods to be 1:5. However, his study is based on the industrial sector and an
economy-wide elasticity is expected to be somewhat lower. Varying the parame-
ter, however, does not change the steady-state values of the economy much. The
elasticity is set to be 0:8, and the corresponding elasticity for trading partners,
, is also set to be 0:8 for simplicity.
20http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LEVEL#
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The home bias parameter in the nal good production function, , is chosen
in order to reproduce an import share similar to the Norwegian economy, and
is set to 0:7. Together, the two parameters,  and , result in a weight on
imported goods in the consumer price index close to 0:3, similar to the weight
of imported goods and services in the consumer price index for Norway. The
home bias parameter for the foreign producers, , is also set to 0:7 for simplicity.
The probability of passing away, , is chosen to match the expected remain-
ing lifetime of a randomly selected person in Norway. The expected lifetime
is about 80 years and, assuming a symmetrical age distribution, the expected
remaining lifetime of a randomly chosen person is 40 years. As a result, the
probability of passing away is set to 1160 per quarter.
21
Estimates for the labour dis-utility parameter, , vary in the literature. In
the model in this thesis, 1 corresponds to the Frisch-elasticity of labour. Most
microeconomic studies have estimates of the Frisch-elasticity close to zero, see
e.g. Killingsworth (1984) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). The real
business cycle literature, on the other hand, use estimates based on macro data
and often work with Frisch-elasticities of much higher magnitude (often in excess
of 5, see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). Given the wide range of
values, I follow Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and set  to 1 for
simplicity.
The housing utility parameter, , is set to 1. In the steady-state,  only
matters for the steady-state house prices and it has no eect on the dynamic
solution. As a result,  is set to 1 for simplicity. The housing capital depreciation
rate, h is set equal to the average ratio of housing maintenance costs to housing
capital in the Norwegian data, which results in a quarterly ratio of 0:012.22
The elasticity of substitution between dierentiated intermediate goods, ,
represents a parameter describing the degree of competition in the intermediate
21Recall that the expected remaining lifetime of a household with constant probability of
death, 1

, is
P1
t=1 t(1   )t 1 =  + 2(1   ) + 3(1   )2 + ::: = 1 , implying that the
expected remaining lifetime when  = 1
160
is 160 quarters, i.e. 40 years.
22Statistics Norway, National accounts 2012 (https://www.ssb.no/en/nasjonalregnskap-og-
konjunkturer/statistikker/knr).
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goods market since  1 can be interpreted as the price mark-up. Estimates in
the literature typically range between 3 and 11, see e.g. Domowitz, Hubbard
and Petersen (1988). In this model, the value for  is chosen to be 6, equal
to the parameter value used in the Norwegian Economic Model (NEMO), see
Brubakk et al. (2006).23. The degree of competition in the foreign market, ,
is also set to 6 for simplicity.
5.2 Dynamic Parameters
There are four parameters that matter for the dynamic responses of the model:
the three stickiness parameters, PQ, PM and PM

, and the endogenous
risk premium parameter, . The stickiness parameters are set equal to the
respective values in NEMO, where these are estimated by a Bayesian approach.
Hence, PQ is set equal to 1500 and PM

is set equal to 2300, while the cost
of changing prices for foreign intermediate goods exporters to Norway is set
equal to the domestic intermediate goods import cost of changing prices, hence
PM = PM

= 2300.
The parameter on the endogenous risk premium determines the dynamic
response of the exchange rate to shocks in the model. When  is set to zero,
the exchange rate moves in the same qualitative direction, but the response is
smaller and more permanent.24 In this thesis, the value of  is set to 0:01, which
results in an exchange rate impulse response persistence approximately similar
to Norwegian data on exchange rate movements to oil price shocks (Aastveit,
Bjrnland and Thorsrud (2011)).
6 Results
This section presents the results from numerical simulations of the model from
section 4. The results are presented as impulse response functions, illustrating
23 equal to 6 is also used by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997).
24Setting  to zero is only possible in the nite lifetime version of the model. To allow for
comparison with an innite lifetime model,  is therefore set dierent from zero.
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the evolution of macroeconomic variables following a shock to stochastic state
variables. All variables in the impulse response functions, except the interest
rate, are presented as percentage deviations from steady state.
In a DSGE-framework, the economy is driven by exogenous shocks to stochas-
tic state variables. Absent these shocks, the economy will converge back to a
stable steady-state growth path. I consider three exogenous shocks, (i) a pos-
itive monetary policy shock, (ii) a positive oil price shock and (iii) a negative
foreign marginal cost shock. The following stochastic processes are assumed for
the three stochastic state variables:
t = rt 1 + t
p^x;t = xp^x;t 1 + xt
m^ct = mcm^c

t 1 + 
mc
t
(56)
where t is a monetary policy shock, p^x;t is the oil price gap, m^c

t is the foreign
marginal cost gap, jt is assumed to be normally distributed with standard de-
viation jt for j 2 fR; x;mcg, and j are persistence parameters for the shock
processes.
This section is divided in three parts. First, I present the results from a
positive monetary policy shock in order to clarify how monetary policy operates
in the economy. Second, in order to estimate the eects of an oil price increase
on the Norwegian economy, I discuss the results from a positive oil price shock
under optimal monetary policy. Third, I present the results from a negative
foreign cost shock to illustrate how the increased inow of cheap imports have
aected the Norwegian economy during the last decade.
6.1 A Positive Monetary Policy Shock
This subsection presents the numerical results of a positive monetary policy
shock corresponding to an increase in the interest rate of 100 basis points per
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year.25 The parameters are calibrated using the values from section 5. The
persistence parameter of the monetary policy shock, r is set to 0:5.
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of an increase in the interest rate
where each period corresponds to one quarter. Price ination gures and inter-
est rates are annualised. There are two transmission mechanisms of monetary
policy in the model: (i) a demand channel, and (ii) an exchange rate channel.
Through the demand channel, a higher interest rate induces households to save
more thereby leading to lower demand. As a result, consumption and housing
prices fall. The nal goods sector experiences lower demand and buys less of
both inputs, thus both the volume and the prices of imported and domesti-
cally produced intermediate goods fall. The domestic intermediate goods sector
compensates for lower domestic demand by lowering export prices and thereby
increasing their exports somewhat. However, the domestic intermediate goods
rms are unable to compensate fully and therefore the total production of do-
mestic intermediate goods is lower. As a result, they demand less labour, which
subsequently leads to both lower employment and lower real wages.
The interest rate also aects the exchange rate. Investors seek to maximise
prots and choose between operating in the domestic and the foreign market.
The law of one price implies that the return in both markets should be equal.
Hence, when the domestic interest rate increases, the exchange rate appreciates
to clear the markets. A higher interest rate in Norway therefore results in a
nominal exchange rate appreciation. The isolated eects from the exchange
rate appreciation are lower import prices and higher export prices, resulting in
higher imports and lower exports. However, from gure 6, it is evident that the
demand channel dominates the import sector whereas the two eects appears
to cancel out in the export sector.
In general, the eects on consumer prices and output depend on the relative
change in various variables. Consumer prices are a composite of import prices
and the prices on domestically sold intermediate goods and the total eect
25The monetary policy shock is modelled as a shock process to the central bank loss function,
L(t) = 1
2
((^t+t)2+y^2t + r(Rt Rt 1)2), where t is the shock process described above.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a positive monetary policy shock. All variables
(except the interest rates) are percentage deviations from steady-state. Interest
rates and ination gures are annualised.
37
thus depends on the relative changes in these. Following a monetary policy
shock, both import price ination and domestically sold intermediate goods
price ination fall, resulting in lower consumer prices. For mainland output,
the total eect depends on three volume components: (i) consumption, (ii)
imports, and (iii) exports. Following an interest rate increase, consumption
fall, implying lower output, and imports are lower, implying higher output.
Exports, on the other hand, barely move. In the benchmark calibration, the
eect on consumption dominates and as a result, following an interest rate
increase, output falls.
The results of a monetary policy shock show clearly how interest rate changes
aect in the economy. In particular, by increasing the key policy rate, the central
bank is able to reduce the consumer ination rate, output and asset prices, and
to achieve a real exchange rate appreciation.
6.2 A Positive Oil Price Shock
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the model variables to a temporary
increase in the oil price of 10 percent. All impulse responses are presented
as percentage deviations from steady-state (except the interest rates) and the
ination gures and interest rates are annualised. In the simulation, x is set
to be 0:85 to approximately match the empirical estimates of an AR(1) process
of the oil price, implying a temporary but persistent oil price shock.
The oil price shock aects the economy through two channels: (i) a demand
channel and (ii) an exchange rate channel. First, through the demand channel,
an increase in the oil price will increase the size of the sovereign wealth fund.
Through the scal rule, this will increase the future transfers to households,
raising the present value of future household income and subsequent demand.
Second, through the exchange rate channel, a positive oil price shock results in
higher net foreign assets in the economy because the size of the sovereign wealth
fund increase. This aects the exchange rate by lowering the endogenous risk
premium, leading to a nominal exchange rate appreciation.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses following a positive oil price shock. All variables
(except the interest rates) are percentage deviations from steady-state. Interest
rates and ination gures are annualised.
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The impulse responses in gure 7 illustrate these mechanisms. As a result
of higher lifetime income, households demand more consumption goods and
housing; and they supply less labour. Subsequently, consumption and housing
prices increase, and hours worked fall. Furthermore, lower willingness to work
makes real wages increase through the wage bargaining process. Households
want to smooth the eects of the shock across their lifetime. As a result, after
the initial shock to income and the subsequent higher consumption, they will
increase their lending abroad, attempting to maintain some of the high level of
consumption and resulting in an increase in net foreign debt held by households.
Through the exchange rate channel, higher oil prices result in a nominal
exchange rate appreciation. As a result, export prices increase and import
prices decrease, and the nal goods producer substitutes away from domesti-
cally produced intermediate goods toward imports. Furthermore, through the
demand channel, higher oil prices result in higher demand, driving up the prices
on imports and domestically sold intermediate goods. For import prices, the
exchange rate eect dominates, hence following an oil price increase, import
prices fall. For domestically sold intermediate goods, higher domestic demand
result in higher prices, but the eect is limited because the nal goods rm
substitutes away from domestically produced intermediate goods. As a result,
following higher oil prices, export price ination increases, import price ina-
tion falls while price ination on domestically sold intermediate goods increases
somewhat. The total eect on consumer prices depends on the relative changes
in import prices and the prices on domestically produced intermediate goods.
In the benchmark calibration, the eects from lower import prices dominate.
Hence, following a positive oil price shock, consumer price ination falls, how-
ever by a small amount.
Following higher oil prices, the volume of exports, imports and domestically
sold intermediate goods change as well. Export prices increase following the
nominal exchange rate appreciation, resulting in lower exports of intermediate
goods. For import prices, the total eect from the oil price shock is lower import
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prices which lead to higher imports. Furthermore, higher oil prices result in an
increase in domestic demand, further increasing imports. The volume of imports
therefore increases signicantly. The increase in domestic demand also results
in an increase in the volume of domestically sold intermediate goods. The total
eect on mainland output is a combination of the changes in consumption and
exports, minus the increase in imports. Consumption increases, implying higher
output, but, on the other hand, exports fall, resulting in lower output and higher
imports. Given these contrary eects, the total eect on mainland output is an
increase, however by a small amount.
Monetary policy response to a positive oil price shock
The central bank loss function contains consumer price ination and mainland
output, both measured as percentage deviations from their steady-state levels,
and an interest rate smoothing term. As explained above, following the positive
oil price shock, consumer price ination falls while output increases. The central
bank therefore faces a trade-o since a higher interest rate will reduce the output
gap, but at the cost of even lower ination. The trade-o is implicitly quantied
in the loss function and it is the relative eects on consumer prices and output
which determine the optimal interest rate path. In the benchmark simulation,
the central bank chooses to raise its interest rate somewhat, implying that the
increase in output outweighs the decrease in consumer price ination, before
gradually lowering the interest rate. The interest rate response, however, is
small.
The impulse responses also reveal that the eects of the oil price shock is
very long-lasting. The sovereign wealth fund eectively acts to transform a tem-
porary oil price shock into a near permanent shock to the Norwegian economy.
Hence, the impulses to the macroeconomic variables are very persistent, some
of them, for example the eect on household debt, lasting more than ten years
before being stabilised. Furthermore, the impulse responses reveal that the cen-
tral bank is unable to stabilise the economy within a short time-horizon since
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it cannot, by its interest rate policy, aect the main transmission mechanism of
oil price shocks, namely the increase in the sovereign wealth fund and the sub-
sequent transfers to households. As a result, the model suggests that monetary
policy has limited abilities to stabilise the economy following an oil price shock.
The numerical impulse responses following a positive oil price shock repre-
sent the rst key result from this thesis. The model, with a monetary policy
regime similar to that of Norges Bank, is able to replicate key features of the
Norwegian economy during the last decade. The impulse responses indicate that
following higher oil prices, the macroeconomic variables are aected as follows:
(i) housing prices increase, (ii) household debt increases, (iii) consumption in-
creases, (iv) output increases, (v) the real exchange rate appreciates, (vi) there
is a divergence in the relative prices of the intermediate goods; prices on im-
ports fall while prices on domestically produced goods increase, (vii) real wages
increase, (viii) the central bank increases its interest rate, and (ix) the terms of
trade is strengthened as a result of lower import prices, higher export prices,
and higher oil prices. All these features have been prominent in Norway during
the last decade.
6.3 A Negative Foreign Marginal Cost Shock
During the last decade, the Norwegian economy has experienced an increased
inow of low-cost goods from emerging economies. In this section, I study the
eects of such a switch toward cheaper imports and simulate a negative shock
to the foreign marginal cost. In the simulation, mc is set to 0:5, implying
some persistence in the shock process. The initial shock is set to a 10 percent
decrease in foreign marginal costs.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses of the economic variables from a nega-
tive foreign marginal cost shock. The shock aects the economy through import
prices. Since it becomes cheaper to produce abroad, the foreign producers lower
their prices to maximise prots - resulting in lower import prices in Norway.
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Subsequently, the nal goods rm will substitute away from domestic interme-
diate goods toward more imports in its production. As a result, the volume of
imports increases while the sale of domestic intermediate goods falls. The initial
eect on import prices also aects consumer prices, resulting in lower consumer
price ination.
Lower consumer price ination aects the households through an income
and a substitution eect. First, lower consumer price ination increases the real
income of households, resulting in higher demand for all goods. As a result,
consumption is higher, housing prices increase and the supply of labour falls
because households desire more leisure. Second, the substitution eect implies
that consumption is cheaper relative to housing and leisure. Hence, households
want to adjust toward even more consumption relative to housing and leisure.
The total eect is dominated by the income eect resulting in more consumption,
higher housing prices and lower supply of labour. Furthermore, following the
lower labour supply, households are able to increase the real wage through a
strengthened wage bargaining position.
Households use foreign assets to smooth their consumption path. As ex-
plained above, a negative foreign marginal cost shock results in a period of
temporary high income. During this period, households save some of their cap-
ital in foreign assets to smooth their consumption. Hence, following a negative
foreign marginal cost shock, households temporary increase their holdings of
foreign assets. As the eects from the shock gradually retract, the households
consume their accumulated assets, lowering their net foreign assets.
Domestic intermediate goods rms face several eects from lower foreign
marginal costs. First, households lower their labour supply, resulting in higher
real wages and lower domestic intermediate goods production. Higher real wages
aect prices on domestic intermediate goods, resulting in higher prices on both
domestically sold intermediate goods and exports. Second, there is an increase
in consumer demand. As a result, the production of nal goods increase, lead-
ing to more demand for domestically sold intermediate goods. Third, the lower
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Figure 8: Impulse responses following a negative shock to the foreign marginal
cost. All variables (except the interest rate) are percentage deviations from
steady-state. Interest rates and ination gures are annualised.
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import prices following the initial shock results in a substitution away from
domestically sold intermediate goods toward imports. And fourth, the central
bank lowers the interest rate,26 resulting in a nominal exchange rate depre-
ciation, and subsequently, import prices increase while export prices decrease
somewhat. The total eect on the domestic intermediate goods sector is: higher
price ination on exports and lower price ination on domestically sold interme-
diate goods, indicating that the substitution eect away from domestically sold
intermediate goods dominates. For mainland output, consumption increase, re-
sulting in higher output, however by less than the total eect on consumption
because some of the consumption goods are imported. As a result, mainland
output increase, however, by a small amount.
Monetary policy response to a negative foreign marginal cost shock
Following the foreign marginal cost shock, consumer price ination is lower
while output increases somewhat. Again, the central bank faces a trade-o.
Lower consumer prices imply a lower interest rate while higher output implies
a higher interest rate. Qualitatively, these are the same eects as the positive
oil price shock, but the timing and relative size of the eects have changed.
When foreign marginal costs fall, the eects on consumer prices are larger and
more pronounced during the rst few quarters than the eects on output. By
minimising the loss function, the central bank chooses to reduce the interest rate.
The impulse responses to a negative shock to the foreign marginal cost repre-
sent the second key result of this thesis. During the last decade, the Norwegian
economy has experienced lower import prices as a result of an increased inow
of goods from low-cost emerging economies. The model shows that lower foreign
marginal costs aect the economy in key dimensions: (i) housing prices increase,
(ii) household debt decreases somewhat, (iii) consumption increases, (iv) output
increases, (v) the real exchange rate depreciates, (vi) there is a divergence in the
26The monetary policy response will be further discussed below.
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relative prices of intermediate goods, prices on imports fall more than prices on
domestically sold goods, (vii) real wages increase, (viii) the central bank lowers
its interest rate, and (ix) the terms of trade is strengthened as a result of lower
import prices and higher export prices.
7 Result Robustness and Policy Implications
Since the early 2000s, the oil price has increased substantially and there has
been an increasing inow of imports from low-cost emerging economies. The
model presented in this thesis provides impulse responses of a positive oil price
shock and a negative foreign marginal cost shock that match the evolution of the
Norwegian economy during the last decade well. Following these two shocks, the
economy should experience an increase in consumption, production, real wages
and housing prices, and a fall in the prices on imported goods. Furthermore,
assuming that the oil price shock dominates, there should also be an exchange
rate appreciation, an increase in the prices on domestically sold intermediate
goods and an increase in household debt levels. As a result, by a combination of
a positive oil price shock and a negative foreign price shock, the model is able to
replicate most major movements in macroeconomic variables of the Norwegian
economy during the last decade.
There are, however, some troubling aspects of these results. Note in partic-
ular that by studying the impulse responses, it is evident that the shocks to the
Norwegian economy are long-lived. The sovereign wealth fund eectively acts
to transform temporary changes into near permanent shocks to the Norwegian
economy. The monetary policy responses of the central bank have limited ef-
fects on the evolution of the macroeconomic variables. This is a result of two
features. First, both the oil price shock and the foreign marginal cost shock
present the central bank with a trade-o, and as a consequence, monetary pol-
icy responses are small. Second, the central bank is unable to address one of
the main transmission mechanisms of the shocks, namely the sovereign wealth
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fund and the subsequent future transfers to households - perhaps suggesting
that scal policy is better suited to respond. In this section, I investigate the
robustness of the results and discuss the implications for monetary and scal
policy, respectively.
7.1 Monetary Policy Implications
In the numerical simulations of this thesis, a exible ination targeting regime
similar to that of Norges Bank has been applied. When responding to the oil
price shock and the foreign marginal cost shock, the central bank faces a trade-
o due to the fact that output and consumer price ination move in opposite
directions. Furthermore, the impulse responses of output and consumer price
ination are small. Subsequently, the interest rate responses are small and have
limited eects on the evolution of macroeconomic variables. In this subsection
I investigate the robustness of this result. First, the small monetary policy
responses could possibly be an artifact of the calibration of the model. And
second, the limited eects of monetary policy could be a result of a wrong
monetary policy regime set-up.
7.1.1 Result Robustness
In the model framework in this thesis, the responses of output and consumer
price ination are sensitive to how the model is calibrated. The response of
consumer price ination depends on the relative changes in prices of imports
and domestically sold intermediate goods. As a result, the consumer price in-
ation responses are sensitive to the numerical values given to the stickiness
parameters (PM , PM

and PQ) and the elasticity of substitution between
foreign and domestically produced intermediate goods in the production of nal
goods, . Through dierent value combinations of these parameters, any qual-
itative response in the consumer price ination is possible following the foreign
price shocks. However, although a dierent parameter set-up is able to change
the sign of the consumer price responses, the numerical movements will still be
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small.
Output is also sensitive to the numerical value given to the elasticity of
substitution between foreign and domestically produced intermediate goods in
the production of nal goods, . An elasticity of substitution lower than 1, for
example, indicating that the demand for imports and domestically produced
goods change less than one for one with price changes, generally produces a
positive output response to a positive oil price shock, while setting it above 1
switches the response. In other words, it is possible to change the sign of the
response, but again the numerical responses will be small.
Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution generally aects consumer price
ination and output in opposite directions. A higher  will for example re-
sult in lower output and higher consumer price ination following a positive oil
price shock. This is a result of the higher price sensitivity, demanding less price
changes to achieve volume changes. Consequently, changes in the elasticity of
substitution will generally have small eects on monetary policy as the two ef-
fects dampen each other and the trade-o in monetary policy persists. Although
the sensitivity of the monetary policy responses are limited with regard to the
calibration of the model, the fragile nature of the qualitative responses suggests
that the researcher should strenuously seek to nd the true parametrisation to
allow the model to most closely represent the economy, a path sought in the
work with this thesis.
Hence, changes in the calibration of the model may change the central bank
responses qualitatively, but will have limited numerical eects on the economy.
Whatever the calibration is, trade-os will be prevalent under exible ination
targeting and the interest rate responses of the central bank will be small. This
leads to the result that if monetary policy is to respond more strongly to foreign
price impulses, a change in the monetary policy regime is necessary.
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7.1.2 Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes
Under a exible ination targeting regime, the central bank puts weight on
consumer price ination and the output gap when setting the interest rate policy.
As shown above, trade-os will be prevalent and the interest rate responses
small following changes in the oil price or the foreign marginal cost. A monetary
policy regime that explicitly puts more weight on components aected by foreign
price shocks in the loss function will respond more strongly to the oil price and
foreign marginal cost shocks. In particular, explicitly adding the oil price in the
loss function by using the GDP deator or nominal income as monetary policy
target instead of the consumer price index, for example, will result in stronger
interest rate responses to oil price shocks. Although these alternative regimes
might dier from the direct welfare optimising central bank loss function, when
analysing an oil price shock they might fare better in the long run by limiting
the level of foreign debt and limiting nancial fragility.
Figure 9 demonstrates the impulse responses from a positive oil price shock
on the Norwegian economy using two monetary policy regimes, (i) the exible
ination targeting regime presented in this thesis and (ii) an alternative regime
targeting GDP deator ination and mainland output. For the reasons laid out
above, it is clear that the central bank increases the interest rate to a larger
extent when targeting the GDP deator than the consumer price index. As a
result, there are major changes in the responses of macroeconomic variables. In
the alternative regime, consumption, housing prices, output, employment and
wages drop signicantly following the interest rate increase. Furthermore, the
exchange rate appreciates almost twice as much. Although these responses seem
to represent an overreaction from the central bank because some of the macroe-
conomic variables are strongly aected without being stabilised, the example
suggests that, by putting some weight on a wider price target, the central bank
will change its optimal interest rate path, and that it may be possible to achieve
a more stable evolution of many macroeconomic variables in the event of an oil
price shock.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses following a positive oil price shock under two mon-
etary regimes. All variables (except the interest rate) are percentage deviations
from steady-state. Interest rates and ination gures are annualised.
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There are, however, two aspects of the impulse responses in gure 9 which
cause unease. First, some economic variables are virtually unaltered by the in-
terest rate policy. The ination rate of export prices, import prices and domesti-
cally sold intermediate goods prices change very little when changing monetary
policy regime. Second, the long-run path of the macroeconomic variables change
very little. Hence, after the initial strong central bank response, the oil price
is stabilised after about one year and the dierence between consumer price
targeting and GDP-deator targeting gradually disappears. As a consequence,
the two regimes start to converge to a common interest rate path. This change
in regime is therefore unable to alter the long-run paths of the macroeconomic
variables.
The limited long-run eects of a regime change is further a result of the
inability of monetary policy to address the transmission mechanism of oil price
shocks. When the oil price increases, the sovereign wealth fund accumulates
assets and the future transfers to households increase. These are aspects of the
economy which monetary policy has limited possibility to address because the
domestic interest rate has limited eect on the future return from the sovereign
wealth fund. When monetary policy tries to stabilise an economy which ex-
periences shocks and mechanisms that monetary policy cannot address, it will
either not respond, or respond by changing the variables it can aect. In other
words, monetary policy will either refrain from treating its patient or be lim-
ited to marginalise the symptoms, in either case letting the illness persist. For
example, when targeting GDP deator ination, the central bank will change
the components of the GDP deator it can aect, output and consumer prices.
In order to truly stabilise the economy following an oil price shock, economic
policy has to address the actual transmission mechanism, which in this case is
the scal rule of the sovereign wealth fund.
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7.2 Fiscal Policy Implications: An Alternative Fiscal Pol-
icy Rule
The Norwegian scal policy rule can be transformed to eliminate the eects of
oil prices on future transfers to households. In order to achieve this, the future
transfers from the sovereign wealth fund have to be independent of the current
oil price and subsequently be independent of the current size of the fund. In
other words, transfers must be determined by an exogenous rule. I suggest one
such rule: the value rule.
The value rule states that the transfers from the sovereign fund should be
constant, adjusted for consumer prices and productivity. I.e., in nominal terms,
the transfers should grow by the consumer price ination27 and the growth rate
of productivity. This ensures that transfers from the sovereign wealth fund are
independent of the price of oil and the size of the fund, and as a result, the
transmission mechanism in the model of this thesis would be eliminated.
A major problem of this method, however, would be to set the value today
and commit to this level in the innite future. Changing political movements
and circumstances could aect the commitment of the government and the value
of the transfers should therefore, to the best possible extent, reect an objec-
tively chosen level rather than being arbitrarily chosen. One such possibility
could be to use the permanent income rule, see for example Jafarov and Leigh
(2007), where the transfers from the fund is set to the annuity value of net
wealth, dened as the sum of net assets and the discounted value of future oil
revenue. In the formulation by Jafarov and Leigh (2007), the rule is constructed
such that transfers are a constant fraction of real GDP. The permanent income
rule is, however, aected by oil price changes because the calculation of future
oil revenue depends on the current oil price. Hence, in order to preserve the
transfers from the sovereign wealth fund as independent of the oil price, the
permanent income rule can only be used to calculate the initial value for the
27The consumer price index which best represents the costs of the consumption without
taking oil into account. In the case of Norway, the CPI-ATE (consumer prices adjusted for
taxes and energy prices) represents one such measure.
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value rule.
Naturally, a number of assumptions must be made in order to calculate the
annuity value of net wealth. For example, the future path of real returns and
productivity growth are needed, in addition to the expected future price and
extraction rate of oil. Furthermore, government obligations are likely to increase
in the future as a result of increasing pension expenditures and the expectation
of a period of restructuring when the oil resource is depleted. I will therefore
argue that the estimate should be conservative to allow for some precautionary
savings in the fund.
To conclude, I argue that a viable route for the Norwegian economy would
be to use the value rule, calculating the initial value by a conservative per-
manent income rule. This would ensure that the eects of oil price changes
are limited. Furthermore, to allow for some readjustments, I suggest that the
value is recalculated by the permanent income rule at xed time intervals, for
example each decade, thus ensuring that the transfers from the oil fund will,
in the long run, be a constant fraction of real GDP. In addition, it will enable
monetary policy makers to easier achieve price and output stability, in addition
to nancial stability.
Although this rule succeeds in making transfers from the sovereign wealth
fund independent of the current oil price, there may be other considerations
which are more pressing. For example, such a change in rule could have im-
portant implications for wider aspects of scal policy such as taxation, or there
could possibly be important intergenerational distributional and demographic
aspects of such a change. These problems, however, are beyond the scope of
this thesis.
8 Conclusion
The main innovation of this thesis is to model the eects of foreign price changes
in a DSGE-model for a small commodity exporting economy with a sovereign
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wealth fund. In particular, I have analysed the eects of an oil price shock on
the Norwegian economy through the transfers to households from the sovereign
wealth fund. Following higher oil prices, the sovereign wealth fund increases,
subsequently increasing the future transfers from the fund. The fund there-
fore eectively acts to transform temporary price changes into near permanent
shocks to the Norwegian economy.
A rst key result of this thesis is that the model is able to replicate key
features of the Norwegian economy during the last decade. Since the early
2000s, two foreign price shocks have been prominent in Norway, (i) the oil price
has almost quadrupled since 2004, and (ii) there has been a sharp increase in
imports from low-cost emerging markets, resulting in lower prices on imports.
Using a combination of these two shocks, the model is able to reproduce major
movements in macroeconomic variables. In particular, since year 2000, there
has been an increase in consumption, real wages, housing prices and household
debt, a real exchange rate appreciation, and a divergence in the relative prices
of intermediate goods - import prices have fallen while domestic prices have
increased. All these features was replicated by the model.
As a second key result, the model shows that monetary policy under ex-
ible ination targeting, where the central bank's main concern is to stabilise
consumer price ination and output, is unable to fully stabilise the economy
following foreign price shocks. This is a result of two factors: there is a trade-o
between the two target variables and the movements in these target variables
are small. As a consequence, the interest rate response of the central bank is
very limited. This result is robust to the model calibration.
Other monetary policy regimes could ensure stronger interest rate responses.
For example, GDP deator targeting implicitly targets the oil price because the
oil price enters as a factor in the calculation of the GDP deator, and eectively
ensures that the central bank responds strongly to oil price movements. The
comparison of dierent monetary policy regimes, however, reveals a further
result of this thesis: namely that monetary policy is unable to stabilise the long-
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run movements in macroeconomic variables following oil price shocks because
it cannot address the main transmission mechanism, the sovereign wealth fund.
The best monetary policy makers can do is therefore to dampen the symptoms,
but not address the actual transmission mechanism. In order to truly address
the eects of oil price shocks on the Norwegian economy, the scal rule for
the sovereign wealth fund has to be transformed. A new scal rule, where the
transfers from the sovereign wealth fund grow by the rate of productivity and
price ination, can eliminate the transmission channel from oil price shocks to
the real economy and therefore eectively stabilise the economy following oil
price movements.
The model in this thesis only models one explicit aspect of foreign price
shocks, the transmission through the sovereign wealth fund. A possible exten-
sion is to model the eects of oil prices through the wage formation in the oil
exporting sector, aecting the wage formation in the whole economy. This chan-
nel could be more short-lived and temporary. Furthermore, if wage stickiness
is introduced as well, there is possibly a more appropriate and eective role for
monetary policy; however beyond the scope of this thesis.
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A Yaari-Blanchard Budget Constraint
The insurance company provides fair (competitive) insurance against passing
away with positive wealth. The insurance company receives all assets of those
who die and pays a fair premium to all who survive.
In a competitive environment, the prots for the insurance company is zero:
Divinst = Premt   (1  )(Rt 1)At 1 = 0
The competitive no-prot solution for the insurance premium is then Premt =
1 
 RtAt. Inserting this into the individual budget constraint yields:
Cs;t(j) +Bs;t(j) + StB

s;t(j) + Ph;tHs;t(j) 
Ph;tHs;t 1(j)(1  h)
1   +
Rt 1Bs;t 1(j)
t(1  ) +
StR

t 1B

s;t 1(j)
t (1  )
+
WtNs;t(j) +Divs;t(j) + Ts;t(j)
(57)
B Individual Dynamic Consumption
From the individual optimisation problem, we have the following budget con-
straint and euler-equation:
Ct +Bt + StB

t + Ph;tHt 
Ph;tHt 1(1  h)
1   +
Rt 1Bt 1
t(1  ) +
StR

t 1B

t 1
t (1  )
+
WtNt +Divt + Tt
(58)
and
1 = RtEt[
Ct
Ct+1
1
t+1
] (59)
Simplifying the equations by noting that Bt = 0 8 t because all households
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are the same, denoting Inct = WtNt + Divt + Tt, using non-satiation to get
equality in the budget constraint, and rewriting the euler-equation yields:
Ct + StB

t + Ph;tHt =
Ph;tHt 1(1  h)
1   +
StR

t 1B

t 1
t (1  )
+ Inct (60)
and
EtCT = 
T tEtRt;TCt
1
t;T
(61)
Now, iterating the budget constraint forward yields:
0 =
StR

t 1B

t 1
t (1  )
 
1X
T=t
(1  )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
CT +
1X
T=t
(1  )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
IncT
+
1X
T=t
(1  )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
[
Ph;THT 1(1  h)
1     Ph;THT ] + limT!1
(1  )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
ST+1B

T+1
(62)
Using the euler-equation to substitute for the CT , renaming the expressions
It =
P1
T=t
(1 )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
IncT and H
HH
t =
P1
T=t
(1 )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
[
Ph;THT 1(1 h)
1   
Ph;THT ], and assuming limT!1
(1 )T tt;T
Rt;TSt;T
ST+1B

T+1 = 0, the result is
Ct = [1  (1  )][
StR

t 1B

t 1
t (1  )
+ It +H
HH
t ] (63)
C Aggregate Dynamic Consumption
From the aggregate version of the household optimisation problem, we have the
following budget constraint and dynamic consumption equation:
Ct + Ph;tHt +BHH;t + StB

HH;t = Ph;tHt 1 +
BHH;t 1Rt 1
t
+
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
+WtNt +Divt + Tt
(64)
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Ct = [1  (1  )][
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
+ It] (65)
Note that BHH;t = 0, the net holding of domestic assets for households is
zero. Now, using Inct =WtNt +Divt + Tt, assuming that the housing stock is
constant, and iterating the budget constraint one step forward yields:
StB

HH;t =
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
+ Inct   Ct (66)
Now, iterating the aggregate dynamic consumption equation one step for-
ward yields:
Ct+1 = [1  (1  )][
St+1R

tB

HH;t
t+1
+ It+1] (67)
Using the budget constraint to substitute in for BHH;t gives:
Ct+1 = [1  (1  )][
St+1R

tR

t 1B

HH;t 1
tt+1
+
St+1R

t Inct
Stt+1
  St+1R

tCt
Stt+1
+ It+1]
(68)
which simplies to:
Ct+1 = [1  (1  )][
St+1R

tR

t 1B

HH;t 1
tt+1
+ St+1R

tCt
Stt+1
+ I 0t] (69)
where I 0t = It+1 +
St+1R

t Inct
Stt+1
.
Now, using the aggregate dynamic consumption equation at time t and mul-
tiplying by
St+1R

t
St(1 )t+1 gives:
I 0t =
St+1R

t
Stt+1(1  )(1  (1  ))
Ct  
St+1R

tR

t 1
tt+1(1  )
BHH;t 1 (70)
Using this to replace for I 0t in equation (69) yields:
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Ct+1 = [1  (1  )][
St+1R

tR

t 1
t+1

t
BHH;t 1( 

1   )
 St+1R

t
Stt+1
Ct
(1  (1  ))
(1  (1  ))(1  ) ]
(71)
Solving this for Ct yields:
Ct =
1  
 + (1  )2EtfDt;t+1t+1Ct+1g+ 
(1  (1  ))
 + (1  )2
StR

t 1B

HH;t 1
t
(72)
D Optimal Price Setting in the Intermediate Goods
Sector
In this appendix, I present the derivation of the rst order condition for price
setting of the domestic price, PQ;t. The intermediate goods rm, i, produce
under monopolistic competition and quadratic price adjustment costs, PM

t (i).
The demand for the domestic intermediate goods of the individual rm is as-
sumed to follow a CES aggregate:
Qt(i) =
PQ;t(i)
PQ;t
 
Qt (73)
where Qt(i) is the goods sold domestically by rm i and PQ;t(i) is the price
charged by rm i. Furthermore, production by rm i is given by:
Y 0t (i) = ZtNt(i) = Qt(i) +M

t (i) (74)
i.e. the produced goods Y 0t (i) is equal to goods sold (Qt(i)+M

t (i)). Prots
for rm i at time t is then given by:
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PQ;t(i)Qt(i)+PM;t(i)M

t (i) WtNt(i) PQt (i)PQ;tQt PM

t (i)PM;tM

t (75)
Hence, prots are the sum of sales, PQ;t(i)Qt(i) + PM;t(i)M

t (i), minus
production costs, WtNt(i), and the price adjustment costs, 
PQ
t (i)PQ;tQt +
PM

t (i)PM;tM

t . Due to the price adjustment costs, the price setting today
matters for price setting tomorrow. The rm therefore has to take dynamic
eects of price setting into account and set prices to maximise the discounted
sum of prots:
max
PQ;t(i)
Et
1X
t=0
fDt;t+1[PQ;t(i)
1 
P Q;t
Qt Wt
Zt
PQ;t(i)
 
P Q;t
Qt 
PQ
2
[
PQ;t(i)
PQ;t
PQ;t 1
PQ;t 2
]2PQ;tQt+f(M
)g
(76)
where f(M) is some function not depending on PQ;t(i). The rst order
condition with respect to PQ;t(i) is then:
0 = (1  )PQ;t(i)
 
P Q;t
Qt + 
Wt
Zt
PQ;t(i)
 1 
P Q;t
Qt
 PQPQ;tQt[Q;t(i)
Q;t 1
  1][ 1
PQ;t 1Q;t 1
]
+EtfDt;t+1PQ2PQ;t+1Qt+1[Q;t+1(i)
Q;t(i)
  1][ Q;t+1(i)
PQ;t(i)Q;t(i)
]
(77)
Using the fact that all rms are equal and face the same constraints, PQ;t(i) =
PQ;t and PQ;t+1(i) = PQ;t+1. Furthermore, using the fact that mct = Wt and
divide through by Qt yields:
mct
PQ;tZt
=    1 + PQ[ Q;t
Q;t 1
  1][ Q;t
Q;t 1
]
 2EtfDt;t+1PQQt+1
Qt
Q;t+1[
Q;t+1
Q;t
  1][Q;t+1
Q;t
]g
(78)
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Now, solving this for PQ;t yields the equation for optimal price setting:
PQ;t = 
mct
Zt
[(   1) + PQ Q;t
Q;t 1
(
Q;t
Q;t 1
  1)
 PQEtfDt;t+1Qt+1
Qt
Q;t+1
Q;t+1
Q;t
(
Q;t+1
Q;t
  1)g] 1
(79)
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